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12	C. ITOH MIDDLE EAST E.C. (Bahrain) through the real party in interest, NATIONAL	CASE NO. SC090220
13	UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY OF PITTSBURGH, PA,	Assigned for all purposes to Honorable John L. Segal
14	Plaintiff,	REPLY IN SUPPORT OF REQUEST
15	A CONTRACTOR OF THE STATE OF TH	FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE BY DEFENDANT INTERNET
16	v. INTERNET CORPORATION FOR	CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS AND
17	ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS,	ERRONEOUSLY-NAMED DEFENDANT INTERNET
18	INTERNET ASSIGNED NUMBERS AUTHORITY, the PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC	ASSIGNED NUMBERS AUTHORITY
19	OF THE CONGO, and THE CONGOLESE REDEMPTION FUND,	[Reply in Support of Demurrer to
20	Defendants.	Plaintiff's Complaint, and Supplemental Request for Judicial Notice and Declaration of Samantha Eisner filed
21		concurrently herewith; Compendium of Non-California Authorities lodged
22		concurrently herewith]
23		DATE: November 3, 2006 TIME: 8:30 a.m.
24		DEPT: M
25		Complaint Filed: June 28, 2006
26		
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INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff C. Itoh Middle East E.C. (Bahrain), through the real party in interest National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pa., ("plaintiff"), urges this Court to accept an absurd rule – that no documents should be judicially noticed upon demurrer if the plaintiff argues that the documents are self-serving. Of course, this would eliminate the entire purpose of permitting courts to take judicial notice. The documents that Defendant Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers' and erroneously-named Defendant Internet Assigned Numbers Authority's (collectively, "ICANN") has attached to its request for judicial notice are relevant to this action and prove that certain of plaintiff's allegations are demonstrably false. Lawsuits should not have to proceed to the (expensive) discovery phase if the defendant can prove via judicial notice that the plaintiff cannot prove material allegations of its complaint.

As to plaintiff's concerns regarding ICANN's discovery responses, the truth is every single document that ICANN seeks to have judicially noticed is publicly available *through the links that ICANN provided to plaintiff in response to its document requests.* ICANN obviously is not under any obligation to produce documents that are equally available to plaintiff, although ICANN identified how plaintiff could obtain those documents (mostly on ICANN's Internet web site).

I. GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS ARE PROPER SUBJECTS OF JUDICIAL NOTICE UNDER EVIDENCE CODE SECTION 452(C).

ICANN requests that the Court take judicial notice of two government contracts that ICANN entered into with the United States Department of Commerce ("DOC") to perform certain functions related to the Domain Name System: (i) the Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU") and Amendment 6 thereto, and (ii) the March 13, 2006 IANA Functions Purchase Order ("IANA Contract"). (RJN at 1:27-2:13; Declaration of Sean Jaquez ISO RJN ("Jaquez Decl."), Exs. B, C, D.) Both agreements may be judicially noticed under California Evidence Code section 452(c), which allows judicial notice of "official acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the United States and of any of the United States." See, e.g., Lungren v. Community Redevelopment Agency, 56 Cal. App. 4th 868, 871 (1997) (taking judicial notice of

a redevelopment agency's agreement with an Indian tribe); *Mendez v. Pacific Gas and Electric Co.*, 115 Cal. App. 2d 192, 195 (1953) (taking judicial notice of contract between an electric company and the federal government). Plaintiff does not dispute that these agreements constitute "official acts" of the government.¹

Moreover, the Court may consider both agreements not only for their existence but also for their content. *Mendez*, 115 Cal. App. at 195 (in action against local power supplier, "[t]he trial court was bound to notice judicially the provisions of the contract [between non-party federal government and local power supplier] and in considering the complaint to read the pleading as if the contract were set out in full therein. When so considered the complaint in effect pleaded that the Federal Government constructed, owned and operated the complete and entire electric distribution system") (internal citations omitted). Thus pursuant to *Mendez*, this Court may judicially notice that the IANA Contract expressly states that ICANN does not have authority to delegate or redelegate a ccTLD. (Eisner Decl., Ex. A at §§ C.2.2.1.2, C.4.1, C.4.2, C.4.3, Appx. A; Ex. B at 7 n.7; Jaquez Decl., Ex. D §§ C2.1.1.2, C4.1 (the contract does not allow ICANN to make changes to root zone files "that constitute delegation or re-delegation of top level domains").) That authority remains with the DOC alone. (*Id.*)

A. The DOC Contracts Are Valid and Complete.

Plaintiff argues that the validity and completeness of the agreements are "unclear" because: (1) the agreements have expired; and (2) there could be "other" relevant agreements between ICANN and DOC that are not alleged. (RJN Opp. at 6:10-7:19.) Plaintiff is wrong.

Plaintiff's citation to Gould v. Maryland Sound Indus., Inc., 31 Cal. App. 4th 1137, 1144-46 (1995), is inapposite. (Dem. Opp. at 5.) The court in Gould refused to take judicial notice of the contract at issue because: (1) it was between private parties; (2) it was an implied contract; and (3) language within the contract was disputed by the parties to the contract. Id. at 1145. None of these issues are present here, and the DOC recently confirmed in an unrelated action the interpretation of the contract that ICANN asserts here. (Declaration of Samantha Eisner ISO Supplemental Request for Judicial Notice ISO Demurrer ("Eisner Decl."), Ex. B at 7 n.7 ("ICANN submits its recommendations with respect to modifications to the authoritative root zone file as one of its responsibilities under the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) functions contract with the DOC. The terms of the contract make it clear that ICANN does not have the authority to authorize the changes.") (emphasis added).)

1. ICANN has Not Requested Judicial Notice of Inoperative Agreements.

When ICANN filed its Request for Judicial Notice, it attached the *then-operative* version of the MOU and the IANA Contract. On September 29, 2006 – a month after ICANN's filing – the DOC and ICANN entered into a Joint Project Agreement (attached as Exhibit 4 to the Declaration of Edward Johnson), which constitutes the most recent amendment to the MOU. The parties then entered into a new IANA Contract on October 1, 2006. ICANN brought the pendency of the new IANA Contract to the Court's attention in ICANN's Demurrer and noted that the provisions relevant to this litigation were not materially different. (Dem. at 3 n.5.)²

2. All Agreements Between ICANN and the DOC are Alleged.

Plaintiff next argues that the MOU and the IANA Contract are "only part of the contractual arrangements between ICANN and the DOC." (RJN Opp. at 7:4-5.) But the MOU (and its amendments) and the IANA Contract (and its amendments) are the *only* operative agreements between ICANN and the DOC. Indeed, the DOC web site provides links to its agreements with ICANN at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/icann.htm (ICANN) and http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/iana.htm (IANA functions).

Plaintiff's only basis to claim that "other" agreements exist between ICANN and the DOC is a reference in ICANN's Objections and Responses to Plaintiff's Requests for Production of Documents, which reads: "Some of the information requested by Plaintiff *concerns* agreements between the [DOC] for ICANN's performance of the IANA function . . . Defendants object . . . on the grounds . . . that it seeks proprietary or confidential information, disclosure of which is prohibited *by those contractual relationships* " (Johnson Decl., Ex. 1 at 3:4-8 (emphasis added); *see* RJN Opp. at 7:8-9.) ICANN's statement, however, in no way indicates that there are "additional agreements" between ICANN and the DOC. (RJN Opp. at 7:9-10.) Rather, ICANN's statement simply maintains that ICANN is obligated – *pursuant to the MOU and the IANA Contract* – not to provide certain documents that are proprietary or confidential.

² For the Court's benefit, ICANN is filing a Supplemental Request for Judicial Notice seeking judicial notice of the October 1, 2006 IANA contract – which, as in the previous IANA Contract, explicitly states that the DOC alone has authority to redelegate a ccTLD. (Eisner Decl., Ex. A at §§ C.2.2.1.2, C.4.1, C.4.2, C.4.3, Appx. A.)

B. The Government Contracts Are Clear That The DOC Alone Has Authority To Redelegate A ccTLD.

Plaintiff contends that the Court should forego judicial notice of the MOU and the IANA Contract because plaintiff (a non-party to both agreements) does not agree with the plain meaning of those agreements. (RJN Opp. at 7:20-9:13.) Plaintiff cites two cases in support of its position, but neither addresses the issue of judicial notice, let alone the issue of judicially noticing a government contract. *Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., Inc.*, 69 Cal. 2d 33, 39-40 (1968); *Hayter Trucking, Inc. v. Shell Western E&P, Inc.*, 18 Cal. App. 4th 1, 20 (1993). Indeed, plaintiff does not cite any case regarding the propriety of judicially noticing a government contract – or any contract for that matter – where a *non-party* to the agreement contends that the provisions are ambiguous.

ICANN and the DOC have been operating under various forms of the MOU and the IANA Contract for over eight years, and ICANN offers them to the Court to explain ICANN's role in the redelegation process. Plaintiff's obviously incorrect interpretation of the agreements should not block judicial notice, especially when both ICANN and the DOC do not dispute the relevant language in those agreements. Cal. Civ. Code § 1636 ("a contract must be so interpreted as to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties as it existed at the time of contracting") (emphasis added); Citizens For Goleta Valley v. HT Santa Barbara, 117 Cal. App. 4th 1073, 1076 (2004) ("the purpose of the law of contracts is to protect the reasonable expectations of the parties [to the contract]") (emphasis added). (See Eisner Decl., Ex. B (DOC Reply) p. 7 n.7 ("ICANN submits its recommendations with respect to modifications to the authoritative root zone file as one of its responsibilities under the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) functions contract with the DOC. The terms of the contract make it clear that ICANN does not have the authority to authorize the changes.") (emphasis added)).)

C. Plaintiff's Extrinsic Evidence Regarding ICANN'S and DOC's Contractual Relationships Does Not Address The ccTLD Redelegation Process.

Plaintiff attempts to bring in extraneous information to show that "ICANN – not the DOC – has authority over the re-delegation process." (RJN Opp. at 8:11-25.) However, these documents do not support plaintiff's conclusion.³ For example, plaintiff argues that the DOC's statement that "ICANN is more autonomous" under the new amendments to the MOU (which is correct), but the amendments do not relieve ICANN from its *separate* contractual obligation under the IANA Contract, which explicitly states that the DOC alone maintains authority to redelegate a ccTLD. (*See* RJN Opp. at 8:16, *citing* Johnson Decl., Ex. 8 (ICANN Press Release, Sept. 29, 2006); Jaquez Decl., Ex. D at §§ C.2.1.1.2, C.4.1, C.4.2, C.4.3; Eisner Decl., Ex. A at §§ C.2.1.2, C.4.1, C.4.2, C.4.3, Appx. A.)

As to plaintiff's reliance on the June 10, 1998 Statement of Policy on Management of Internet Names and Addresses, that 1998 policy is irrelevant to the issue before the Court because: (1) that statement was made prior to the formation of the MOU; and (2) the statement does not address ICANN's role in the ccTLD redelegation process. (RJN Opp. at 8:16-22.)

Finally, plaintiff's citation to the Answer and Affirmative Defenses of the DOC in *ICM* Registry, LLC v. U.S. Department of Commerce and U.S. Dept. of State, ¶ 10 (D.D.C. June 19, 2006) is similarly misleading. Whether the DOC possesses "regulatory authority over ICANN" is not the issue here. ICANN has never claimed that the DOC has "regulatory authority" over ICANN. But ICANN does have contractual obligations to the DOC that require it to seek DOC approval for any ccTLD redelegation. (Dem. at 3:17-5:7; Jaquez Decl., Ex. D at §§ C.2.1.1.2, C.4.1, C.4.2, C.4.3; Eisner Decl., Ex. A at §§ C.2.2.1.2, C.4.1, C.4.2, C.4.3, Appx. A; Ex. B at 7n.7.)

³ Significantly, plaintiff has failed to seek judicial notice of these documents, or any other document it inappropriately relies on in support of its opposition.

II. JUDICIAL NOTICE OF ICANN'S REMAINING EXHIBITS IS PROPER UNDER EVIDENCE CODE SECTION 452(H).

Under Evidence Code section 452(h), judicial notice can be taken of facts and propositions that: (1) are not reasonably subject to dispute; and (2) are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy. Each of the documents that ICANN presents to this Court at Exhibits A (ICANN's Bylaws), E (ICP-1), F (RFC 1591), G (NIC Website excerpts), H (Communiqué of the Governmental Advisory Committee), and I (Letter from Drafting Committee) meet Section 452(h)'s dual-pronged test.

A. Materials Found On Web Sites Are Proper Subjects of Judicial Notice.

Materials found on web sites are appropriate subjects of judicial notice under Section 452(h). ICANN's Request cites several cases to support the assertion that courts routinely take judicial notice of the existence and contents of web sites. (See RJN at 1:9-20.) Plaintiff fails to address a single authority cited by ICANN in opposition.⁴ The fact that each of the requested documents is located on a web site satisfies the second prong of Section 452(h) (i.e., that documents on web sites are "capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy"). Anyone can visit a web site and immediately determine that such documents are, in fact, in existence and discuss the matters alleged.

B. ICANN's Bylaws Are Not Reasonably Subject To Dispute.

Plaintiff presents no argument against judicially-noticing ICANN's Bylaws other than claiming that the Bylaws "are simply irrelevant." (RJN Opp. at 4, n.4.) But ICANN's role in coordinating the Domain Name System is the very reason plaintiff seeks its requested relief from ICANN. Moreover, plaintiff's complaint relies on a Government Advisory Committee ("GAC")

⁴ Plaintiff's cases are inapposite and do not preclude taking judicial notice here. (Dem. Opp. at 4:22-23.) Coalition for Reasonable Regulation of Naturally Occurring Substances v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., 122 Cal. App. 4th 1249, 1255 n.5 (2004) (refusing to take judicial notice of documents on a web site because plaintiff failed to issue a challenge that would make the requested documents relevant to the case); Ross v. Creel Printing & Publ'g Co. 100 Cal. App. 4th 736, 744 (2002) (rejecting plaintiff's attempt to "refer" the court to web sites without any formal request for judicial notice).

⁵ Plaintiff relies on *Mangini v. R.J.Reynolds Tobacco Co.*, 7 Cal. 4th 1057, 1063 (1994) for this "relevance" argument. There, the court refused to take judicial notice of a report on health issues that was wholly irrelevant to the federal preemption issues before the court. But here, all of ICANN's requested documents are directly relevant to this case.

document, yet the Bylaws demonstrate that the GAC is only an ICANN *advisory committee* whose viewpoints represent nothing more than *recommendations* to ICANN. (Jaquez Decl., Ex. A at Art. XI, § 2(1)(a); Compl., Ex. 12 at ¶ 2; Eisner Decl., Ex. B at 2.)

ICANN's Bylaws easily meet the requirements for judicial notice under section 452(h) and have in fact been judicially noticed in the past. See VeriSign, Inc. v. Internet Corp. for Assigned Names and Numbers, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17330 at * 4 n.2, Case No. CV 04-1292 AHM (CTx) (C.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2004) (taking judicial notice of ICANN's Bylaws from ICANN's web site). Moreover, bylaws have also been judicially noticed by the California Supreme Court under section 452(h). See Miller v. Eisenhower Med. Ctr., 27 Cal. 3d 614, 628 (1980) (taking judicial notice of model bylaws substantially identical to the bylaws at issue in the action).

C. <u>Documents Governing The ccTLD Redelegation Process Are Not Reasonably</u> Subject To Dispute.

Through judicial notice of ICP-1 (Exhibit E) and RFC 1591 (Exhibit F), ICANN places before this Court the actual documents that govern the ccTLD redelegation process. Additional documents on the IANA web site demonstrate that the ICP-1 procedures were followed in evaluating *every* ccTLD Redelegation Request.⁶ Plaintiff's lack of familiarity with the redelegation process does not support plaintiff's argument that the documents should not be the subject of judicial notice. (RJN Opp. at 4:14-16.)

This suit is not about whether ICANN has misled the public in the redelegation process. Rather, the Complaint is directed at ICANN's ability to transfer the .cg ccTLD. ICP-1 and RFC 1591 demonstrate that ICANN must consider multiple interests and factors (beyond the foreign government's wishes) in recommending to the DOC whether a ccTLD should be redelegated. (Jaquez Decl., Ex. E at (a), (c)-(e); Ex. F at § 3.) Moreover, both documents support

⁶ The IANA Reports page contains links to the Redelegation Reports for every ccTLD redelegation request since February 2001. (Eisner Decl., Ex. C (IANA Reports About ccTLDs).) Significantly, the documents at each of those links state that ICP-1 procedures are followed. For ease of reference, ICANN offers the three most recent Redelegation Reports for the purpose of demonstrating that each purports to adhere to ICP-1. (Eisner Decl., Ex. D (IANA Reports on the .gd, .ma, and .cx ccTLD Redelegation).)

the finding that ccTLDs are not property. (Jaquez Decl., Ex. E at (b); Ex. F at § 3.2.) There is no basis for this lawsuit to proceed given these facts, which is why plaintiff so strenuously opposes judicial notice. And plaintiff's suggestion that the ICP-1 – a document created in 1999 – is merely "self-serving hearsay" to assist in this litigation is completely inappropriate. Further, RFC 1591 is a set of standards promulgated by the *Internet community as a whole* – not ICANN – and thus it similarly cannot be considered "self-serving hearsay."

D. The Purpose For Judicial Notice Of The GAC Statements Is Not Reasonably Subject To Dispute.

ICANN requests judicial notice of two statements by foreign governments. (Jaquez Decl., Ex. H (GAC Communiqué) and I (Letter from Drafting Committee).)⁸ ICANN's purpose for requesting judicial notice of the GAC Communiqué is to demonstrate that the foreign government signatories to the Communiqué have manifested agreement that no property rights inhere in a ccTLD – not for the purpose of claiming that ccTLDs are, in fact, not property. (Dem. at 9:16-10:25.) The Communiqué is relevant to this action to show that ICANN *and* foreign governments have made statements that ccTLDs are not property. Similarly, the Letter from the Drafting Committee is put before this Court to show that foreign governments have issued support for ICP-1 and the position that neither property rights nor ownership are proper topics of concern in relation to a ccTLD. (*Id*.)⁹

⁷ Plaintiff's cases involve particular types of documents that are prone to hearsay statements or not otherwise the proper subject of judicial notice. *See, e.g., Childs v. State of California*, 144 Cal. App. 3d 155, 162-63 (1983) (refusing to take judicial notice of declaration lacking statement of personal knowledge); *Love v. Wolf*, 226 Cal. App. 2d 378, 403 (1964) (refusing to take judicial notice of "self-serving" testimony at investigation hearing).

⁸ ICANN also seeks judicial notice of the existence of NIC's web site (Jaquez Decl., Ex. G) and its contents, namely that the web site states that domain names are free to Congo residents. ICANN does not request that this Court judicially notice that the domain names are in fact free.

⁹ Plaintiff cites G.S. Rasmussen & Assoc., Inc. v. Kalitta Flying Serv., Inc., 958 F.2d 896 (9th Cir. 1992). (RJN Opp. at 5:20-24.) But that decision has nothing to do with judicial notice (or an attempt to judicially notice property status); instead, the case surveys the law to determine whether a government-issued certificate is property subject to claims of conversion. Id. at 902.

CONCLUSION

ICANN respectfully requests this Court to take judicial notice of Exhibits A-I of ICANN's

Request.

Dated: October 27, 2006

JONES DAY

By: Leftrey A V Wee

Attorneys for Defendant

INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS and erroneously-named defendant INTERNET ASSIGNED NUMBERS

AUTHORITY

PROOF OF SERVICE

I, Grace M. Salter, declare:

I am a citizen of the United States and employed in Los Angeles County, California. I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the within-entitled action. My business address is 555 South Flower Street, Fiftieth Floor, Los Angeles, California 90071-2300. On October 27, 2006, I caused to be served a copy of the within document(s):

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF REQUEST FOR JUDICIATION NOTICE BY DEFENDANT INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS AND ERRONEOUSLY-NAMED DEFENDANT INTERNET ASSIGNED NUBMERS AUTHORITY

- by transmitting via facsimile the document(s) listed above to the fax number(s) set forth below on this date before 5:00 p.m.
- by placing the document(s) listed above in a sealed envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid, in the United States mail at Los Angeles, California addressed as set forth in the attached Service List.
- by placing the document(s) listed above in a sealed Federal Express_envelope and affixing a pre-paid air bill, and causing the envelope to be delivered to a Federal Express agent for delivery.
- by personally delivering the document(s) listed above to the person(s) at the address(es) set forth below.

I am readily familiar with the firm's practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with the U.S. Postal Service on that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one day after date of deposit for mailing in affidavit.

I declare that I am employed in the office of a member of the bar of this court at whose direction the service was made.

Executed on October 27, 2006, at Los Angeles, California.

Grace M. Salter

LAI-2255448v8